Impeachment by Secret Ballot?

Donald Trump's Impeachment hearings have begun at a TV channel near you, and based on the evidence already available in the public domain, it appears that the US House of Representatives is very much likely to impeach the 45th President. That would make him the 3rd of that select group to have faced this ignominy - Andrew Johnson, who took over at the helm after Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, being the first back in 1868; Bill Clinton being the 2nd, in 1998. (Richard Nixon resigned in August 1974, 3 months after his impeachment hearings commenced, but before the House could vote). 

Both Johnson and Clinton were impeached by the House, Johnson by a vote of 128-47 (for intentionally violating an Act of Congress) and Clinton on two counts, by votes of 228-206 (perjury) and 221-212 (obstruction of justice). The subsequent Senate trials of those impeached Presidents - the second step in the process - did not go as per plan however.

Johnson had faced impeachment after he tried to get rid of his Secretary-of-War Edwin Stanton, in defiance of the Tenure of Office Act. The Act, later repealed, prevented the President from removing office-bearers without the approval of the Senate, if those office-bearers had been appointed with the advice & consent of the Senate. Johnson had vetoed the Act when it came before him, and Congress had promptly overridden the veto by passing it with a 2/3rd majority. Johnson went ahead and fired Stanton anyway, giving Congress the opportunity to impeach an unpopular President. The then 54-member Senate voted 35-19 for his removal, 1 short of the requisite 2/3rd majority.

Clinton's impeachment wasn't remotely close. The first count was actually defeated, 45-55, and the second ended at an impasse: 50 for and 50 against, way short of the 67-33 or higher that would have removed the President. The verdict was split almost exactly along party lines: no Democrat voted in favour of his removal (though Republicans, respectively 10 and 5, did cross the aisle to find Clinton not guilty).

Republicans enjoyed a 55-45 majority in the Senate in 1999 when Clinton's trial came before the US Congress' Upper House. Their majority is a thinner 53-45 today (there are 2 independent Senators currently: Angus King from Maine and Bernie Sanders from Vermont). And the US polity is much more entrenched and partisan than it was two decades ago. It's almost impossible, therefore, that if Trump is impeached by the House of Representatives and then tried by the Senate, 20 of the 53 Republicans will vote against him. Not publicly, anyway.

This is where the possibility emerges, expressed by Juleanna Glover in The Politico Magazine earlier this week, that the Senate could consider voting on the removal of Donald Trump by secret ballot. It would appear that this is a political rather than a legal strategy, but it has nonetheless caught the otherwise phlegmatic TDL's attention.

The logic is straightforward: The US Constitution does not specify the manner or the rules of the removal vote - this is left to the Senate to decide for itself, on a case-to-case basis. The rules for the Johnson and the Clinton removals had accordingly been decided by the Senate's of the day, through simple majority, as they will for the Trump removal. So, if 51 Senators decide to include in the rules a stipulation that the final vote on the impeachment article(s) shall be by secret ballot, such a rule would probably withstand a legal challenge. It is believed that this would free up many Republican Senators to vote as per their conscience rather than as per their support bases, whom they would have to face for their re-election campaign. Or because they'd rather have Vice President Pence take over. Or because they detest Trump as much as most Democratic Senators. And since this is after all a trial by jury, it follows that a secret ballot would not be anomalous, since a federal jury also always votes in trials in secret.

While all this seems fine in theory, one wonders whether matters of such consequence should ever be decided by secret ballot. The representatives of the people should do precisely that - represent the people. They should reflect the views and opinions of their constituents, and should be answerable for their choices made on the behalf of the people. Or, as Jim Geraghty argues over on the National Review, such a secret ballot "would represent senators trying to avoid accountability for their votes, during an exercise that is supposed to be a legislative effort to hold the president accountable for his actions."

It must be remembered that the Constitution of India, for example, stipulates voting by MPs and MLAs by secret ballot in the election of the President of India. But not for the impeachment and removal of that President.

Of course, The Dormant Lawyer is only going into this sort of sanctimonious conjecture because there is no precedent for this. The US Constitution does allow its Senate to vote by secret ballot on "questions" such as passing a Bill, adopting an amendment to a Bill and agreeing on a motion or appeal, unless 20 Senators oppose this, but the definition of "questions" does not include removals. As far as TDL has researched, no actual secret ballots have ever been held, but this was very limited research indeed. Either way, any such occurrences would hardly constitute a precedent, given the significance of this matter. Nor are there precedents of abstention in removal trials (30 Republican abstentions would bring the 2/3 threshold from 67 down to 46.67, which would be achieved by the 45 Dems and 2 Independents. Constitutionally, only 67 senators need to be present for the vote).

Which brings us to what sparked off Glover's opinion piece in the first place. Glover, who Wikipedia calls "one of the most powerful Republican lobbyists in Washington", has been a strategist and adviser to several Republican politicians (including President George W. Bush and his VP Dick Cheney), cites Mike Murphy, a fellow-Republican strategist, in her column. It was Murphy who said that 30 Republican Senators would vote to convict Trump if the ballot was secret, according to his source (another Republican senator). Later, former Senator Jeff Flake (Republican from Arizona) said that the number would be 35. Perhaps this is all just bombast, or a strategy to replace Trump with Pence, whom Glover et al might prefer, due to his traditional Republican stance. If there indeed are 35 Republican Senators who would convict Trump if they were promised immunity as it were, perhaps Glover et al are using this gambit to entice those Senators to, instead, abstain. Even that lesser evil would suffice.

Certification of Money Bills - II: The Aadhaar Judgment Perspective

Back in February 2017, TDL dealt with Money Bills, their certification as such by the Speaker, and whether said certification could be challenged in Court ("Certification of Money Bills"). Now, with a Constitution Bench having ruled on this in the Aadhaar matter, it is time to update our understanding of this concept.

We will, of course, not deal with the crux of the Aadhaar judgment here. Everyone will have surely, by now, read all about what was upheld and what was struck down therein, and there really is no need to discuss such momentous matters. It is the minutiae that concern us eccentrics. Our focus therefore begins with paragraph 389 (pg. 458 of 567) of Justice Sikri's judgment.

At the outset, let us note one thing: the Supreme Court has not refrained from going into this matter. That itself is a major landmark, in TDL's opinion. Whether or not the Aadhaar Act should have been passed as a Money Bill is a question that the SC has very much embraced and ruled upon. Kind of.

In paragraph 405, Justice Sikri states the following:

We would also like to observe at this stage that insofar as submission of the respondents about the justiciability of the decision of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha is concerned, we are unable to subscribe to such a contention. Judicial review would be admissible under certain circumstances having regard to the law laid down by this Court in various judgments...

The various judgments His Lordship refers to are the Raja Ram Pal decision (which we have discussed in our Feb-2017 ramble), along with the judgments in S. R. Bommai, Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, Ramdas Athawale and Kihoto Hollohan. To remind ourselves, it was held, for example in Raja Ram Pal, that if the impugned legislative procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to be scrutinised in a court of law.

You can almost hear TDL rejoicing, can't you? The import of this ruling, after all, should be self-evident. No future government, and TDL is looking at those sly and cunning State governments that love to play fast and loose with the Constitution, will ever be able to slip through irrelevant Bills as Money Bills (examples include the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta (Amendment) Act, 2012 and the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2016. Both were passed as Money Bills, though on the face of it, they clearly deal with anything but money matters. Both find special mention in Justice Sikri's judgment, since both were relied upon by the Respondents to contend that the Courts cannot go into these matters).

But wait. In paragraph 412, His Lordship goes on to state:

For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that Bill was rightly introduced as Money Bill. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to deal with the other contentions of the petitioners, namely, whether certification by the Speaker about the Bill being Money Bill is subject to judicial review or not...

Um. So which one is it? Did they or did they not go into this matter? They evidently didn't, though it is clear that they could, in future cases, go into the illegality of procedure, as stated in para 405 above. So why didn't they go into it in this matter? Because they were of the opinion that the Bill was rightly introduced as a Money Bill. So they did go into it then?

TDL hasn't perused Justice Chandrachud The Younger's dissent. It is a colourful one by all accounts, and he has held that the Bill was not a Money Bill. So he has gone into the matter as well. Perhaps TDL should just rest easy and be satisfied with that much. We all know how that will pan out...

Legal implications of Governor's Remission to Rajiv's assassins

As you can see, The Dormant Lawyer has been luxuriating in inactivity, and proud of it too. But as you are aware, long-suffering reader, every once in a while something does catch TDL's eye, causing him to emit a snort and reach for the old laptop. The Tamil Nadu cabinet's recommendation to Governor Purohit to remit the life imprisonment of all the seven convicts in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case to time already served is one such snort-inducing laptop-reaching eye-catcher.

First of all, for the billions of non-lawyer readers of this prolific blog: remission is the reduction of the amount of punishment without changing the character of the punishment (as contrasted with the other powers granted in Art. 161 to the Governor, viz. reprieve - temporary suspension of sentence; respite - postponement of the execution of the sentence; and commutation - changing a punishment to one of a different sort than that originally proposed, e.g. rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment etc. These are all, of course, less efficacious than a pardon, which "not only removes the punishment but, in contemplation of law, places the offender in the same position as if he had never committed the offence.")

Now to the reason why this routine political matter has so stirred the normally unflappable, sloth-like TDL. 

It has been a while, but assuming my memory serves me, Art. 161 restricts the Governor's pardoning powers to matters to which the executive power of the State extends. Yes, here we are: "The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant... remissions of punishment.. of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends." Why is that relevant, you ask? Isn't the Indian Penal Code, under which the conspirators were tried, come under the "law and order" item of the State List, you contend?

It has been an even longer while, but assuming my memory doesn't deceive me, these individuals were tried under various other central Acts as well, including the The Passport Act, The Foreigners Act, The Wireless Telegraphy Act among others, and the Governor's power does not extend to any of these.

In fact, as recently as 27th April 2018, the Madras High Court, in a related matter, had held that the Governor could not consider the representation for premature release made by S. Nalini, the prime conspirator out of these seven, for that very same reason. To quote from the judgment delivered by K.K. Sasidharan, J., in that matter:

In view of the stand taken by the State Government that the conviction of the appellant was also for the offences under various Central enactments, and not only in respect of laws with reference to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws and in view of the pendency of the substantial Writ Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are not in a position to direct the Governor to consider the representation by exercising the power under Article 161 of the Constitution.

(S. Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.A. No. 1619 of 2016)

It would seem that just on this legal ground, the matter should founder before the Governor. Not that that has caused the State government to pause.

If, somehow, the Governor is convinced he has the power in this matter to remit the sentences of each of these seven, it must be considered whether he is bound by the advice of his cabinet. Constitutional convention and Art. 165 would suggest so, and indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled on this issue on several occasions, the most recent being this obiter by a Constitution Bench:

It is also necessary to appreciate, that in the discharge of executive functions, the Governor of a State has the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishments or to suspend, remit or commute sentences (under Article 161). The Governor’s power under Article 161, is undisputedly exercised on the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers.

(Jagdish Singh Khehar, J., in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh State Assembly & Others, 13th July 2016, JT 2016 (7) SC 64)

That, of course, leads us to President Pranab Mukherjee ignoring the recommendation of the Union Home Ministry back in January 2017, a matter that TDL has dealt with at length here followed by here and here. So let's quickly move past that..

We then come to the hypothetical scenario where the Governor of Tamil Nadu remits the sentence of the seven convicts. The Congress has come out in opposition to the proposal, so let us assume that there is indeed an interested party which would seek a remedy against the Governor's remission order. Who would that interested party be? Normally, the victim's next of kin takes up this cause. (One should hesitate to use "Normally" here, but unfortunately there have been far too many instances of the misuse of this gubernatorial power). But in this case, Sonia, Priyanka and Rahul have apparently "forgiven" the convicts. 

Now, in TDL's opinion, the said act of "forgiveness" cannot be legally binding, and will not preclude them from petitioning the court against the Governor's order. There is also the prospect that the act of forgiveness might have been as political a manoeuvre as the remission recommendation (go ahead, call TDL a cynic). Either way, in an enlightened, modern, democratic society built on the concept of the rule of law, victims and victim's kin have as much right to forgive as they have to avenge, viz. none. A crime is an offence committed against the society at large, and the assassination of a former as well as aspiring Prime Minister is an offence against the entire nation, and forgiveness by the PM's kin needn't enter the picture, whether it was heartfelt or vote-felt. 

Further, let's not forget the other victims of the suicide-bomber; apart from her and her target, 14 others lost their lives, and scores more were injured. They and their kin will have a cause of action, no matter what those who survive Rajiv choose to do.

Finally, should a remedy against the Governor's order be available at all? Isn't the Governor exercising a sovereign's prerogative after all? Fortunately, the law on this is settled as well, especially by the Supreme Court on 1st May 2000:

There cannot be any dispute with the proposition of law that the power of granting pardon under Article 161 is very wide and do[es] not contain any limitation as to the time on which and the occasion on which and the circumstances in which the said powers could be exercised. But the said power being a constitutional power conferred upon the Governor by the Constitution is amenable to judicial review on certain limited grounds. The Court, therefore, would be justified in interfering with an order passed by the Governor in exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution if the Governor is found to have exercised the power himself without being advised by the Government or if the Governor transgresses the jurisdiction in exercising the same or it is established that the Governor has passed the order without application of mind or the order in question is a mala fide one or the Governor has passed the order on some extraneous consideration. 

(G. B. Pattanaik, J., in Satpal v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 170)

Let's look at those wise words again: the said power, being a constitutional power, is amenable to judicial review on certain limited grounds, including if the Governor has passed the order without application of mind, or on some extraneous consideration.

The extraneous consideration is rather obvious here. TDL submits that lack of application of mind is also in the offing. The petitioner(s) seeking to overturn the Governor's hypothetical remission order could contend that a blanket remission of all seven convicts would not have been ordered if application of mind had taken place. Surely each convict's case is different. Nalini, for example, had originally been sentenced to death by the trial court but her sentence had not been confirmed by the Supreme Court, after she had given birth to a daughter in prison. Her husband V. Sriharan alias Murugan and two others (T. Sudhendraraja alias Santhan and A. G. Perarivalan) also had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court on grounds of inordinate delay, a decision much praised by the local media. 

His Excellency Banwarilal Purohit has a knotty problem on hand, and TDL is looking on in interest. More on this, fair reader, if it develops in the legal arena. Unfortunately it will probably proceed in the political sphere and dormancy will resume...

Spicy IP

My favourite Intellectual Property portal has recently launched a "Basic Case Law Series". The first post in there pretty much says it all about the purposes of venturing out on that endeavour, and until TDL finds a topic that piques his interest, this should preclude my followers from feeling deprived in the interim...

Bankruptcy Code passes its first brush with the SC with flying colours

The Supreme Court has recently been as busy with landmark decisions as our blog hasn't, rattling out a steady stream of must-read judgments. My billions of followers must have been wondering what my take is on the triple-talaq and right to privacy decisions, but I'm really not going to write anything about those two. TDL is frankly a touch embarrassed that it took this long for our judiciary to arrive at those conclusions, so let's just leave it at that.

The SC's latest significant decision, delivered yesterday (31st Aug) does deserve plenty of attention though. The court hasn't had an occasion to expound on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before this, and they have embraced the opportunity wholeheartedly. Justice Nariman is in fine form, delivering a judgment that will come in handy in all future cases and transactions dealing with the Code, and his commentary deserves our full attention. More of the same please!

Protection of We Men - II

Order withdrawn! Well, that was quick! Many, many thanks to Adv. Jayna Kothari.

Protection of We Men From Domestic Violence

I hate to say "I told you so". Actually, no, who am I kidding, I relish saying "I told you so". So I'm smug and tickled to remind you, my billions of followers, that we had spoken earlier in these here pages of the possibility of the extension of the Domestic Violence Act to victims of all sexes. Accordingly, the Karnataka High Court stepped up to the plate last week to instruct a Magistrate to take cognizance of a complaint filed by a Man under the Domestic Violence Act.

Back then we had 'mourned' the decline in status of the Great Indian Male Persons (GIMPs) - they were not the only ones anymore who were liable to be prosecuted under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 after all, and this gave rise to the possibility that they would soon be able to complain of domestic violence themselves. We had wished though that it would be Parliament that would expand the scope of the Act rather than the Courts, a wish that is looking even more forlorn now. With Parliament too busy certifying non-Money Bills as Money Bills to look into the plight of the greatly enfeebled Indian Men, the judiciary has pulled the ball back into its, er, court.

More to follow, I'm sure. It'll be fascinating, for example, to see how they get past the definition of an aggrieved person in S. 2(a) of the Act, since only such persons, per the Act, can be victims of domestic violence...

The Dormant Blog...

...will reawaken soon.

Certification of Money Bills

The Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Bill, 2017 was introduced in the Lok Sabha yesterday (7th Feb) as a Money Bill and was passed after a reasonably interesting debate headed by the Finance Minister. Nothing noteworthy here - the original 30th December ordinance needed to be placed before Parliament once it reconvened, and it was certified as a Money Bill as it falls comfortably within the restrictions imposed by Article 110 of the Constitution. 

Specifically, Art. 110(1)(b) states that a Bill shall be deemed a Money Bill if it contains (only) provisions dealing with "... the giving of any guarantee by the Government of India, or the amendment of the law with respect to any financial obligations undertaken by the Government of India", and since every currency note is a financial guarantee given by the Government, there can be very little opposition to this Bill's certification as a Money Bill. Not that no one has tried it, of course, but that particular piece is such a misguided polemic, it is best ignored anyway. (The very early use of the word "minions" ensures this, but there's even worse material within, such as the unashamedly incorrect interpretation of Rajya Sabha procedure regarding Rule 228, which deals with motions, not Bills).

There have been other instances though where the Government of the day has leaned upon the Speaker to certify Bills as Money Bills even though they contain provisions outside the list in Art. 110 that are not incidental to the pith and substance of the proposed legislation. The certification of the Bill that resulted in the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial & Other Subsidies, Benefits & Services) Act, 2016 as a Money Bill is one such controversial endorsement; it has been challenged in the Supreme Court and is the subject of the present tirade.

The issues are quite clear: since the Aadhaar Act deals with streamlining the various subsidies that are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, there is sufficient pretext for the Government to certify the Bill as an MB and pre-empt its blocking by the Rajya Sabha, where it was, and continues to be, in minority. The petition challenging the Act contends that much of the Bill deals with providing "a legislative framework for the establishment and maintenance of a central database of identity-related information of residents, and elaborates as to how such information may be collected, stored and used" - issues that are arguably outside the scope of a Money Bill. It must be noted that the petitioner, former Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh, has a thing or two going for him; this is not just a petition by a current Rajya Sabha MP who's feeling left out.

Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi appeared before the SC in May 2016 to oppose the petition relying on Article 122. Certifying a Money Bill is contended to be a power vested in an officer of the Parliament by this Constitution for the purpose of regulating the procedure or the conduct of business in Parliament, and is therefore, per Art. 122(2), not subject to the jurisdiction of any court. The Government's response also contends that Jairam Ramesh should not be allowed to approach the SC under Art. 32 since there is no fundamental rights violation. Mr. Ramesh obviously feels that the right to privacy is the issue here, what with all the biometric information being gathered by the government. All in all, exactly the kind of juicy constitutional issue that we like to see debated.

To be honest, whether or not Art. 32 should have been used should really be immaterial to the issue. The larger concern is whether certification of Money Bills should be governed by guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, or whether the present state of affairs should continue, i.e. the provision in Art. 110(3) "If any question arises as to whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not, the decision of the Speaker of the House of the People thereon should be final" should prevail. 

There is a third path available, as suggested by M. R. Madhavan, the President of PRS Legislative Research: the Lok Sabha create a consultative mechanism - two senior MPs, as is the case with the British House of Commons - to advise the Speaker regarding Money Bill certification. The British provision Mr. Madhavan refers to is contained in S. 1 of the Parliament Act, 1911, the last sentence in clause (3) of which reads as follows: "Before giving his certificate, the Speaker shall consult, if practicable, two members to be appointed from the Chairmen’s Panel at the beginning of each Session by the Committee of Selection." Perusal of a pamphlet regarding Money Bills produced for the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (the Indian equivalent would be the Legislative Department within the Ministry of Law & Justice), reveals that the practice is to nominate one member from each of the two main parties to the "Chairmen's Panel" (now called "Panel of Chairs"). This doesn't seem like a feasible solution at all in our system, and is anyway at best a consultative mechanism which is to be employed "if practicable". Easy to guess what's going to happen there most of the time.

So we are left with the SC regulating parliamentary procedure, a prospect it has usually baulked at in the past; see for example the 2012 case of Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of Uttar Pradesh, wherein a three-judge bench led by Chief Justice Sathasivam refused to delve into the contention that the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta (Amendment) Act, 2012, enacted by the U.P. Legislative Assembly without it passing through the U.P. Legislative Council, should never have been certified as a Money Bill. The Court held that "the question whether a Bill is a Money Bill or not can be raised only in the State Legislative Assembly by a member thereof when the Bill is pending and before it becomes an Act", and stated that the Court was barred from ruling on this by Article 212, the Constitutional provision regarding Procedure in the State Legislatures equivalent to Art. 122. This despite a 2007 Constitutional Bench judgment in Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha, which had held that proceedings which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross irregularity or unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny... 

Art. 212(1) seems to make it possible for a citizen to call in question in the appropriate court of law the validity of any proceedings inside the legislative chamber if his case is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to be scrutinised in a court of law, though such scrutiny is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more than this that the procedure was irregular.

One wishes that Their Three Honours in Saeed Siddiqui had at least considered whether or not the proceedings that resulted in the passage of that Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta Act as a Money Bill were "tainted by unconstitutionality" as they prima facie appear to be, especially since they were pretty much obliged to do so by a Five-Judge Bench...

There is surprisingly scarce jurisprudence on Money Bill certification, at least not much more that TDL could find apart from these few cases. There is a little bit more on Art. 122 and Art. 212, but the ratio from all of those largely is that the court will not interfere, hence the paucity of precedent on Art. 110, really. A pity, because theoretically, there really is nothing stopping a Speaker from certifying whatever s/he wants to as a Money Bill, provided the Lok Sabha doesn't get an opportunity to exercise its power under Art. 94(c). Some sort of discussion on this would really be welcome, and one wonders whether it will be carried out soon.

Now, the Aadhaar Act has suffered a veritable plethora of challenges, as tracked by this wonderful service provided by the Software Freedom Law Centre. The Jairam Ramesh petition, we are told, is scheduled for its next hearing on February 13th. Watch this space!

Mercy Petitions and Presidential Discretion - III

Well, at least I need not be worried about egg on my face anymore, since this article from The Wire showed up in search results today. And, we learn from it that this is actually the second time that the President (this President) has set aside advice given to him by the MHA regarding a mercy petition. The previous instance was the commutation of the death sentence awarded to Jeetendra (aka Jitu Singh Gehlot). Remember this commutation? Me neither. Mind boggling, the lack of footage for this.

Now, I don't want to go on some quixotic crusade, barking in the wind and all. But I really don't know which is more worrying - the fact that the President has begun to make a pattern out of disregarding the advice given to him by his Council of Ministers or the fact that no one seems to be concerned about it at all. Forget concern, The Wire article concludes that "Pranab Mukherjee’s quiet rejection of the government’s advice and the government’s tacit acquiescence to it have shown that it is indeed a proud moment in India’s presidency"! Egad! A proud moment in India's presidency? And what price India's Constitution?

The Indian Express' reporting on this commutation, last updated three days ago, mentions an interesting angle suggested by "sources" as to why the President has chosen this approach:

the President set aside the advice of the ministry as there were concerns about the decision unleashing a fresh round of caste skirmishes in Bihar and also because of the ‘inordinate delay’ by the state Governor in deciding on the mercy petitions

One is immediately reminded, by the first part of the above reasoning, of this commentary on the pardoning power:

The administration of justice through courts of law is part of the constitutional scheme to secure law and order and the protection of life, liberty and property. Under that scheme, it is for the judge to pronounce judgment and sentence, and it is for the executive to enforce them. Normally such enforcement presents no difficulty; but circumstances may arise where carrying out a sentence, or setting the machinery of justice in motion, might imperil the safety of the realm. Thus, if the enforcement of a sentence is likely to lead to bloodshed and revolution, the executive might well pause before exposing the State to such peril. 

[Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 2; H. M. Seervai, 4th Edition, pg. 2093, para. 18.112]

All well and good of course, but that Express article also tells us that the Bihar Governor, Ram Nath Kovind, had rejected the mercy pleas made to him by the four convicts under Art. 161 back in February 2016. And said rejection was indeed based on the advice of the Bihar Government, the particular Executive that would have to deal with any of the dreaded and apprehended renewed caste skirmishes. Now, Mr. Kovind has been a BJP MP in the Rajya Sabha, but the current Council of Ministers in Bihar advising him is drawn not from the BJP, but from the JD(U), RJD and the Congress. Also, since The Wire article focuses on the Dalit antecedents of three of the four, it should be noted that Mr. Kovind (Advocate Kovind, I should say) has been the President of the BJP Dalit Morcha as well as of the All India Koli Samaj. 

Setting aside the politics and returning to the constitutional issues, and the second part of the reasoning mentioned in the Express story: the inordinate delay (by the State Governor) in deciding the mercy petitions. That there has been tremendous delay is undisputed. The offences were committed in 1992 and the death sentence was awarded in 2001 and finally upheld by the SC in 2002. Over 14 years spent on death row is simply unacceptable. 

In its reporting on this, the Hindustan Times informs us that the mercy petitions were forwarded to the President's Secretariat on July 7th 2004. "However, the mercy petitions neither reached the Home Ministry nor the President's Secretariat. It was only after the intervention of the NHRC that these were processed after 12 years." Bizarre indeed, and sufficient reason, even in the otherwise bloodthirsty TDL's opinion, for commuting the sentence.

The Wire piece also uses the 'inordinate delay' line of reasoning, quoting the Shatrughan Chauhan case last seen in the previous post below, wherein a three-judge bench headed by Chief Justice Sathasivam held that undue delay in rejecting mercy petition amounts to torture and causes physical and psychological agony. The Court ruled that

if there is undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution due to pendency of mercy petitions or the executive as well as the constitutional authorities have failed to take note of/consider the relevant aspects, this Court is well within its powers under Article 32 to hear the grievance of the convict and commute the death sentence into life imprisonment on this ground alone.

That's right: this Court is well within its powers to commute the death sentence. Not the President, against the advice of his Ministers. The government should have advised the President appropriately, in light of Shatrughan Chauhan. A more sound procedure: the convicts could have approached the Supreme Court citing Shatrughan Chauhan and have had their sentences commuted, reinforcing the precedent and laying down the guidelines forever. Were none of the many human rights bodies and anti-death penalty organisations (such as the PUDR, so instrumental in Shatrughan Chauhan) in contact with the four, advising them as to their rights? Did we really need to weaken the Constitution to uphold Shatrughan Chauhan?

Another possible additional reason for President Mukherjee's activism with regards to mercy petitions that has been put forward is that his five-year term expires in July and he would understandably wish to depart leaving behind no unfinished business. The President has indeed worked to ensure that he leaves a clean slate for his successor as far as mercy petitions are concerned. It can only be hoped though that the 14th occupant of the chair will regard these incidents as aberrations rather than precedents.

Mercy Petitions and Presidential Discretion - II

Having read about this issue for a day or so now, I'm quite surprised that no hue and cry has been made about the President setting aside the advice of the Ministry of Home Affairs and granting commutation. Maybe I'm reading too much into it? Or maybe one should not rely on the media to present the facts accurately? The law on this has been settled back in 1980 in Maru Ram v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 107] by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court. Apologies for the lengthy quote, but His Honour is not renowned for his brevity..

It is not open either to the President or the Governor to take independent decision or direct release or refuse release of any one of their own choice. It is fundamental to the Westminster system that the Cabinet rules and the Queen reigns. Being too deeply rooted as foundational to our system no serious encounter was met from the learned Solicitor General whose sure grasp of fundamentals did not permit him to controvert the proposition, that the President and the Governor, be they ever so high in textual terminology, are but functional euphemisms promptly acting on and only on the advice of the Council of Ministers save in a narrow area of power. The subject is now beyond controversy, this court having authoritatively laid down the law in Shamsher Singh's case. So, we agree, even without reference to Art, 367 and ss. 3(8)(b) and 3(60)(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that, in the matter of exercise of the powers under Arts. 72 and 161, the two highest dignitaries in our constitutional scheme act and must act not on their own judgment but in accordance with the aid and advice of the ministers. Article 74, after the 42nd Amendment silences speculation and obligates compliance. The Governor vis a vis his Cabinet is no higher than the President save in a narrow area which does not include  Art. 161. The Constitutional conclusion is that the Governor is but a shorthand expression for the State Government and the President is an abbreviation for the Central Government.

In short, acts committed by the President under Art. 72 (or by the Governor under Art. 161) must necessarily conform to the stipulations of Art. 74 (or Art. 163), viz. the titular head of the Executive shall act in accordance with the advice received from his Council of Ministers.

There are plenty of recent judgments where this position has been reiterated. For example, this piece of obiter dicta from H. S. Bedi, J. in Jagdish v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2009) 9 SCC 495 (512)]:

The power of the President and the Governor to grant pardon under Arts. 72 and 161 of the Constitution has to be exercised under on the advice of the Executive Authority.

Or, from Arijit Pasayat, J. in State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj [(2003) 7 SCC 121 (125)]:

The power under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution is absolute and cannot be fettered by any statutory provision such as, Sections 432, 433 or 433-A of the [Criminal Procedure] Code or by any Prison Rules. But the President or the Governor, as the case may be, must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

And finally, P. Sathasivam, CJ. in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India [(2014) 3 SCC 1] provided a detailed overview of the law on the matter of pardons, before noting:

In concise, the power vested in the President under Article 72 and the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution is a Constitutional duty. As a result, it is neither a matter of grace nor a matter of privilege but is an important constitutional responsibility reposed by the people in the highest authority. The power of pardon is essentially an executive action, which needs to be exercised in the aid of justice and not in defiance of it. Further, it is well settled that the power under  Article 72/161 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Since it is a "constitutional duty", it follows that it needs to be executed within constitutional bounds. This isn't to suggest that President Mukherjee should be impeached per Art. 61 for violation of the Constitution, of course, but the entire concern is - why is TDL the only one talking of this? What am I missing, and exactly how much egg will I be left with on my face?

Mercy Petitions and Presidential Discretion

LiveLaw.com reported earlier today that President Pranab Mukherjee commuted the sentence of four death-row convicts to life imprisonment on January 1st. All well and good if you are an unqualified opponent of the death sentence (and The Dormant Lawyer is not one, more on that some other time though). What is singular about this particular act of pardon is that apparently it came against the advice of the Ministry of Home Affairs. According to that LiveLaw report, "this is perhaps the first time that the President used his discretion while considering a mercy petition from a death row convict".

Now, I wish folks at places like LiveLaw stop using terms such as "perhaps". Also, it is not clear whether the above refers to the current President or to Indian Presidents in general. Since the Dormant Lawyer is also the Dormant Teacher, the Dormant Consultant, the Dormant Mentor and the Dormant Rentier this week, he's set out to answer these questions for himself. More on this soon!

Goodbye 2016. And good riddance.

A terribly busy end to year for The Dormant Lawyer in his active other-life, resulting in me having no breathing space whatsoever to get down to writing anything at all (I blame Trump, of course), with plenty of work to be finished in these last two months. Thankfully, at least I never tend to have any currency notes to worry about anyway...

So until I get a chance to write an appropriately scathing review of this infuriatingly frustrating year that has gone by, I'll simply point my millions of followers to some other nice-and-readable material ("The IP scene in India in 2016").

Happy New Year everyone. May your troubles from 2016 be soon turned into dormant memories.

I Beg My Pardon?

Although it is a touch unfair to compare Hillary Clinton's alleged indiscretions with Donald Trump's well-evidenced ones, a running story during this US elections season has been about not the electability but the indictability of both these candidates. The nature of the news coming out has thrown up an unusually large number of questions in the US media about impeachment. A quick sample: Will Hillary Clinton be the first ever President to be impeached in the first year in office? Will Donald Trump be allowed to take the oath of office on 20th January 2017 if he's indicted between election day (8th November) and then? None of these were sufficient to whet TDL's unhealthy appetite for topics for his posts, until this entry on the Wall Street Journal's blog raised a mouth-watering constitutional question, and we must dive in.

The premise is simple enough: can Presidents pardon themselves? The language in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the US Constitution certainly doesn't prohibit this possibility explicitly:

[The President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

The explicit restrictions on the US President's power for pardon, then, are:

• Obviously, the matter under pardon consideration should be an offence, and not a civil matter

• The offence committed should be a federal offence ("against the United States", not its constituent states)

• The pardon cannot affect any impeachment process (against a President, Senator, Judge, Governor, and so on) instituted in a legislature

Other than these restrictions, the pardon power of the President, including the direction of the pardon, seems untrammelled. Is self-pardon prohibited implicitly then? The Heritage Guide to the Constitution seems to lean in that direction, by making the natural justice argument - nemo judex in causa sua:

The possibility of a President pardoning himself for a crime is not precluded by the explicit language of the Constitution, and, during the summer of 1974, some of President Richard M. Nixon's lawyers argued that it was constitutionally permissible. But a broader reading of the Constitution and the general principles of the traditions of United States law might lead to the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutionally impermissible. It would seem to violate the principles that a man should not be a judge in his own case; that the rule of law is supreme and the United States is a nation of laws, not men; and that the President is not above the law.

Even Nixon, that paragon of all things slimy and scary when it comes to overweening Presidential power, resigned rather than taking the self-pardon route. Ronald Reagan had also landed in a not too dissimilar situation with his Iran-Contra dealings. His aides and supporters too believed that he could and should pardon himself. Ultimately, he did nothing, and managed to escape indictment anyway, depriving us once again of the precedent that we crave so desperately. The question rose to prominence again during Bill Clinton's impeachment proceedings, a topic covered intensively by Judge Richard Posner in his book on the subject. Bill Clinton actually went ahead and issued a statement promising he will not pardon himself in the event of an indictment, something many believe he should not have done, including Judge Posner, who writes:

It has generally been inferred from the breadth of the constitutional language that the President can indeed pardon himself, and although this conclusion has been challenged, it is unlikely that the present Supreme Court would be bold enough, in the teeth of the constitutional language, to read into the pardon clause an exception for self-pardoning. Unlikely, but not inconceivable.

This line of reasoning kept the question open, and we still don't have anything approaching an indisputable answer, though this definitive article published in the Yale Law Journal really should have put the issue to rest. Noting, though, the current partisan rancour and the propensities of these two candidates, especially The Donald, we just might get the debate that we anticipate with every fibre of our gluttonous appetite sometime in the next four years.

Next time: the law of pardons in India. Unless Trump gets elected, in which case I will be busy dumping my drastically diminishing equity portfolio...

Go Air v. Indigo Airlines: no updates

Nothing can be found reported in the legal media about the framing of the issues for this case that we've discussed earlier, so TDL is left with no option but to plunder from elsewhere this week, by pointing to this opinion-piece on Spicy IP. See you again soon!

Domestic Violence and the Adult Male Person

The Supreme Court's judgment in Hiral Harsora v. Kusum Harsora was brought to TDL's notice last weekend (thanks BP!), and boy is it an intriguing one. I really should have published this post several days ago, but it took me quite a while to get my head around the judgment (it's quite clear I really, really needed to start this blog!), and while I was doing so, new commentary on the judgment kept popping up, and its assimilation took even longer. Anyway, here we finally are.

The DV Act

India's domestic violence statute - the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ("the DV Act") - was enacted to ensure the protection of women from abuse by adult male persons (or so we thought), and offers civil remedies, over and above the criminal proceedings that can be undertaken as per Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. In its decade-old existence, the DV Act has given rise to rich debate ranging from the customary media criticism, to a successful awareness campaign ("Bell bajao"), and the judgment we're considering today expands the scope of the Act and adds to the already lively and wide-ranging jurisprudence on this matter.

TDL had to first recall that the DV Act protects not just a wife (from abuse by her husband), but also a mother (from abuse by her son), or a sister (from abuse by her brother); i.e. any adult male person related to a woman by blood/adoption or marriage/live-in relationship can be made a "respondent" by the woman if she is facing abuse (physical, verbal, economical, sexual) from him in their shared household. The fact that such a legislation needed to be enacted doesn't reflect well on the country's men; they come off as really contemptible, these adult male persons (AMPs). Great Indian Male Persons of course don't stop at that: they have been known to express their manhood by not dirtying their hands, and getting their mother/sister to instead abuse their womenfolk. The DV Act, therefore, handles this scenario through a proviso in the definition of a respondent.

Section 2(q):

“respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.

It is clear that this expansion in the definition of the respondent by the proviso to S. 2(q) is applicable only to a woman who is married to the AMP or is in a live-in relationship with an AMP. Only a wife/partner can seek relief against abuse committed by her husband/partner's (male/female) relatives; a mother/sister's options are restricted to the AMP only. It is this restriction that the Supreme Court has now done away with.

Other relevant terms defined by the Act:

S. 2(a)

“aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

S. 2(f)

“domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;

S. 2(s)

“shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.

The Case

Kusum and her mother Pushpa Harsora filed a complaint under the DV Act in April 2007 against Kusum's brother (and Pushpa's son) Pradeep, Pradeep's wife Hiral, and Kusum & Pradeep's two other sisters (S1 and S2. Sorry.) alleging "various acts of violence against them". This complaint was withdrawn a couple of months later. In October 2010, the mother-daughter duo filed two fresh complaints, one against Pradeep and a separate one against Hiral and S1 & S2, who applied to the Metropolitan Magistrate to discharge them, arguing that a complaint under Sections 2(a) and 2(q) of the DV Act can be made only against an adult male person. These three female respondents failed to secure a discharge from the Magistrate, but succeeded in their subsequent writ petition before the Bombay High Court, which "on a literal construction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three respondents from the complaint."

It was then Kusum and Pushpa's turn to file a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the DV Act, which had prevented them from complaining against their female blood-relatives or daughters-in-law. A division bench of the Bombay High Court found that S. 2(q) needed to be "read down" in order for it to not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

[W]e are inclined to read down the provisions of section 2(q) of the DV Act and to hold that the provisions of "respondent" in section 2(q) of the DV Act is not to be read in isolation but has to be read as a part of the scheme of the DV Act, and particularly along with the definitions of "aggrieved person", “domestic relationship" and "shared household" in clauses (a), (f) and (s) of section 2 of the  DV Act.

The court went on to hold that a complaint against female blood-relatives (or daughters-in-law) would be maintainable, provided they were co-respondents in a complaint against an adult male respondent. Hiral et al appealed to the Supreme Court against this judgment, and hearings were held before Kurien Joseph and Rohintan Fali Nariman, JJ.

The Judgment

Justice Nariman has dutifully quoted Sr. Adv. Harin Raval's arguments for the appellants, and it's difficult to refute them, really:

[He] has argued before us that it is clear that the “respondent” as defined in Section 2(q) of the said Act can only mean an adult male person. He has further argued that the proviso to Section 2(q) extends “respondent” only in the case of an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage, in which case even a female relative of the husband or male partner may be arraigned as a respondent. He sought to assail the judgment on the ground that the Court has not read down the provision of Section 2(q), but has in fact read the proviso into the main enacting part of the said definition, something that was impermissible in law.

Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv. for Kusum-Pushpa, argued by drawing from her quiver the "social beneficial legislation" arrow, submitting that any definition which seeks to restrict the reach of such legislation would have to be either struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or read down. She went on to contend that 

the object of the Act is to afford the largest possible protection to women from domestic violence by any person, male or female, who happens to share either a domestic relationship or shared household with the said woman, and the expression "adult male person" goes contrary to this object and should be struck down for violating Art. 14 and deleted from S. 2(q). The Act as a whole would continue to stand and the object sought to be achieved would only then be fulfilled.

The Court ended up agreeing with Ms. Arora's contentions, as summarized in this Bar & Bench report. The words "adult male person" have been deleted from S. 2(q) for violating Art. 14. What is not immediately clear though, is the reasoning employed to arrive at this conclusion. 

There has been surprisingly scant legal criticism of this judgment (this article, published earlier today, offers a social criticism, sort of), so I'm expecting my millions of followers to join in the debate in comments below the line. I'll kick off the debate by remembering the P&H High Court's judgment in Krishan Lal v. Union of India:

Article 14 of the Constitution accords equality of treatment to all persons similarly situated. Any invidious discrimination is obnoxious to equality. Thus, the husband and relatives of husband of a married woman form a class apart by themselves and it amounts to reasonable classification especially when a married woman is treated with cruelty within the four-walls of the house of her husband and there is no likelihood of any evidence available. Consequently, Section 498A of the Code cannot be said to be offensive of Article 14 of the Constitution.

So husbands and their female relatives, apparently, form a class of their own, when acting in collusion against the wife, so that provisions such as S. 498A of IPC and the proviso to S. 2(q) of DV Act are saved from being assailed by Art. 14, but adult males on their own do not form a separate class, as that would go against the true object of the Act? Of the Domestic Violence Act?

A significant role in the Court arriving at its conclusions was played by the Delhi High Court's 2011 judgment in Kusum Lata Sharma v. State, wherein it was held that a woman is entitled to file a complaint under the DV Act against her daughter-in-law. This judgment was appealed against but the Supreme Court had dismissed the Special Leave Petition. Pinky Anand, Additional Solicitor General of India, submitted therefore that, by extension, a woman (Pushpa) can file a complaint against her daughters (S1 & S2) or a woman (Kusum) can file a complaint against her sisters, and the Government of India saw no reason to interfere. 

The Kusum Lata Sharma judgment itself relies on the Supreme Court's opinion in Sandhya Wankhede v. Manoj Wankhade, a case that deals with a woman filing a complaint against her husband's female relatives, and so shouldn't have such significant precedential value in a female v. non-2(q)-proviso female case. Kusum Lata Sharma also relies on Varsha Kapoor v. Union of India, another case that falls under the purview of 2(q)'s proviso. Both Sandhya Wankhade and Varsha Kapoor ended up holding that "relative" in the proviso to S. 2(q) can mean female relative as well. Which of course is fine. Extending that logic to say that any complaint under the DV Act can be filed against any female relative, and in fact against non-adult male relatives, even when the AMPs in the household seemingly sit back watching the proceedings passively, is a rather large leap, in TDL's opinion. And I'm not even going to talk about the example given in the judgment about a 16-17 year-old boy committing domestic violence but getting away with it because of the protection offered by "adult" in AMP. The impugned judgment by the Bombay High Court begins to seem like an appropriate-enough measure.

This is not to say that the outcome is necessarily harmful or that the motive is sinister, just that the reasoning doesn't seem too sound. It is understandable to try and extend the scope of the DV Act to include abuse committed by women (daughters/sisters/daughters-in-law) on other women (mothers/sisters/mothers-in-law respectively); there must be many cases that demonstrate the pervasiveness of this category of domestic violence. TDL believes this expansion could have been left to Parliament. In fact, it won't be surprising to study in the near future a DV Act that protects all individuals (females, males, others) from domestic violence...

Concluding Thoughts

So, another bastion of rightful male dominance has crumbled. AMPs can basically sit brooding quietly in the corner, reminiscing on their erstwhile power and influence, quoting Tennyson's Ulysses out of context. Even women can now be dragged into court for abusing women. They really won't have much use of us at this rate...